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42 U.S.C. § 1983-BUYING JUSTICE: THE
ROLE OF RELEASE-DISMISSAL
AGREEMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. 1187 (1987)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Town of Newton v. Rumery, 1 a criminal defendant threatened to
bring a civil suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 19832 against the city in
which he was arrested and the officers who arrested him.3 The par-
ties subsequently entered into a contract, known as a release-dismis-
sal agreement, whereby the town agreed to drop all criminal charges
if the defendant promised not to bring a civil action.4 The United
States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant in certain cases
may waive his right to a section 1983 remedy in exchange for the
state's dismissal of the criminal charges.5
Most lower courts, including the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit in Rumery, have adopted a per se rule
against release-dismissal agreements. 6 The Supreme Court con-
cluded, to the contrary, that a defendant's choice to enter a release-
dismissal agreement often reflects a rational conclusion that the cost
of giving up his civil claim is significantly less than the burden of
facing prosecution. 7 Because the Court recognized that such agree-
ments benefit both parties, it held that they are not invalid per se as
long as the criminal defendant enters into them voluntarily and
1 107 S. Ct. 1187 (1987).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1985) states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
3 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1191.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 1192.
6 See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
7 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1193.
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there exists no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct.8 Thus, the
Court rejected the per se rule against release-dismissal agreements
and, instead, instructed the lower courts to review the agreements
on a case-by-case basis.9 The dissent in Rumery identified a variety
of drawbacks to the agreements but hesitated to support the per se
rule against their enforcement. 10
This Note analyzes the majority's decision, pointing out its
strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, this Note argues that release-
dismissal agreements should have remained forbidden per se.
While such contracts undeniably benefit certain individuals, the ulti-
mate harm that release-dismissal agreements cause outweighs any of
the benefits they may produce. This Note examines both precedent
and public policy and concludes that release-dismissal agreements
serve no legitimate interest.
II. FACTS
In 1983, a Rockingham County, New Hampshire grand jury in-
dicted David Champy for the aggravated felonious assault of Mary
Deary."1 Respondent Bernard Rumery, a friend of Champy and an
acquaintance of Deary, sought information about the charges. 12 He
telephoned Deary, who was upset by the call. 13 On March 12, 1983
Deary told David Barrett, the Chief of Police for the Town of
Newton, that Rumery was trying to force her to drop the charges
against Champy. 14
On May 11, Rumery again spoke with Deary. 15 Rumery claimed
that Deary called him and that she initiated discussion of Champy's
ordeal.16 According to the police record, however, Deary told Chief
Barrett that Rumery had threatened her. 17 Rumery allegedly told
Deary that if she did not drop the charges, she would "end up like"
two women who had recently been murdered in Lowell, Massachu-
setts.18 Consequently, Chief Barrett arrested Rumery, charging him
8 Id. at 1195.
9 Id. at 1192.
10 Id. at 1205 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
I1 Id. at 1190.
12 Id.









with tampering with a witness, 19 which is a Class B felony.20
Rumery retained criminal defense attorney Stephen Woods,
who contacted Brian Graf, the Deputy County Attorney for Rock-
ingham County.2 ' Woods told Graf that he should drop the charges
because Rumery would certainly win the criminal case and because
Rumery intended to bring a civil action against the Town of Newton
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.22
The town's case against Rumery contained certain basic weak-
nesses. First, the town had no written statement by Deary, sworn or
unsworn, that implicated Rumery in any criminal activity. 23 In fact,
Deputy County Attorney Graf knew that Deary was unwilling to tes-
tify against Rumery.24 Second, the report on which Chief Barrett
based his decision to arrest Rumery was of questionable merit.25
Specifically, Barrett based his report, in part, on his conversation
with Deary's daughter and, in part, on his conversation with Deary
when she was in a state of extreme emotional distress. 26 In fact, the
dissent in Rumery pointed out that "[e]ven the arresting prosecutor
who was in charge of the case was surprised to learn that Chief Bar-
rett had arrested respondent on the basis of the information in the
police report." 27 Thus, the police arrested Rumery with neither a
written statement from Deary nor an adequate police report.
A few days before his hearing to determine probable cause,
Rumery entered into a release-dismissal agreement with the prose-
cutor.28 Under this agreement, the prosecutor dismissed the crimi-
nal charges against Rumery in exchange for Rumery's promise not
to sue the Town of Newton, its officials, or Deary for any harm
caused by his arrest.29 All of the parties agreed that one factor in
this decision was protecting Deary from the trauma she might suffer
19 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 641:5, I(b) (1986) states in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of a Class B Felony if: Believing that an official proceeding
... or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to induce or
otherwise cause a person to...
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document or thing.
20 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 625:9 (III)(a)(2) states in pertinent part that,
Class B felonies are crimes so designated by statute within ... this code and any
crime defined outside this code for which the maximum penalty, exclusive of fine, is
imprisonment in excess of one year but not in excess of 7 years.
21 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1191.
22 For relevant text of this section, supra note 2.
23 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1199 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24 Id. at 1191.
25 Id. at 1199 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).




if she were forced to testify against Rumery. 30
Although his attorney explained the consequences of the re-
lease-dismissal agreement to Rumery before he signed it, Rumery
nevertheless filed an action against the Town of Newton under sec-
tion 1983 in the Federal District Court for the District of New
Hampshire in April 1984.31 He claimed that the town and its of-
ficers violated his constitutional rights by falsely arresting him and
by imprisoning and defaming him.32 In turn, the defendants filed a
motion to dismiss, using the release-dismissal agreement as an af-
firmative defense.3 3 Rumery then argued that the release-dismissal
agreement was unenforceable because it violated public policy.34
The district court rejected Rumery's contention, concluding
that a "release of claims under section 1983 is valid ... if it results
from a decision that is 'voluntary, deliberate, and informed.' 35
Moreover, the court recognized that Rumery was knowledgeable
and experienced in the business world. His knowledge and experi-
ence provided him with the ability rationally to weigh the alterna-
tives and conclude that the release-dismissal agreement was in his
best interest.36 The court, therefore, dismissed Rumery's suit.3 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit re-
versed the holding of the lower court. 38 The court of appeals stated
that "[a]lthough we recognize the latitude which prosecutors neces-
sarily must have in determining whether to prosecute criminal
charges, a criminal defendant's decision to assert a civil rights claim
is not a factor which the prosecutor should consider." 39 Moreover,
the court noted that the enforcement of release-dismissal agree-
ments "would tempt prosecutors to trump up charges in reaction to
a defendant's civil rights claim, suppress evidence of police miscon-
duct, and leave unremedied deprivations of constitutional rights." 40
Based on this rationale, the court held that "a covenant not to sue
public officials for alleged violations of constitutional rights, negoti-






35 Id. (quoting petition for cert. app. at B-6).
36 Id. (citing petition for cert. app. at B-4).
37 Id.
38 Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 1985), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1187
(1987).
39 778 F.2d at 70.
40 Id. at 69.
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criminal charges, is void as against public policy." 4' The court,
therefore, adopted a per se rule against release-dismissal covenants
which contain promises not to sue public officials for alleged viola-
tions of constitutional rights in exchange for dismissal of criminal
charges. 42
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded for
dismissal the holding of the First Circuit. The majority, in an opin-
ion written by Justice Powell,43 adopted the district court's test of
whether a release-dismissal agreement is enforceable. The Court
concluded that a criminal defendant may bargain away his right to a
civil remedy if his decision is voluntary, not adverse to relevant pub-
lic interests, and not the result of prosecutorial misconduct. 44
At the outset, the Court recognized that a contract is unen-
forceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed by any
public policy harmed by enforcement. 45 The Court disagreed with
the appeals court's conclusion, however, that public policy concerns
outweigh any interest in the enforcement of the release-dismissal
agreement at hand. The majority declared that "the court [of ap-
peals] overstated the perceived problems and also failed to credit
the significant public interests that such agreements can further."46
Although the Court noted that in certain cases a release-dismissal
agreement may infringe upon the rights of the criminal defendant, it
held that the "mere possibility" of such harm does not justify a per
se rule against such agreements. 47
The Court went on to reject Rumery's contention that it is un-
fair to present a criminal defendant with a choice between facing
criminal charges and waiving his right to sue under section 1983.
The Court pointed out that criminal defendants are often required
to make a number of difficult decisions which ultimately result in the
waiver of constitutional rights.48 For instance, the majority recog-
41 Id. at 71.
42 Id.
43 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice Scalia, and Justice O'Connor
joined Justice Powell in concluding that the courts must evaluate release-dismissal
agreements on a case-by-case basis, that a per se rule against release-dismissal agree-
ments is improper, and that Rumery is bound by his agreement. 107 S. Ct. at 1194-95.
44 Id. at 1195.






nized that plea bargaining does not violate the Constitution even
though a guilty plea results in the waiving of significant constitu-
tional rights.4 9 The Court also cited Corbitt v. New Jersey,50 in which a
statute imposing higher sentences on defendants who went to trial
than on those who entered guilty pleas was upheld, as further evi-
dence of the difficult choices that defendants must make. Based on
these examples, the majority saw "no reason to believe that release-
dismissal agreements pose a more coercive choice than other situa-
tions we have accepted." 5 1
After upholding the general validity of release-dismissal agree-
ments, the Court then discussed how such a contract benefited
Rumery. The Court recognized that Rumery's decision to enter into
the agreement reflected a highly rational conclusion that the obvi-
ous benefits of avoiding criminal prosecutions outweighed the
"speculative benefits of prevailing in a civil action." 52 Furthermore,
to illustrate the rational and voluntary character of Rumery's deci-
sion to enter into the release-dismissal covenant, the Court empha-
sized the fact that Rumery was a sophisticated businessman who was
represented by an experienced criminal lawyer.53
A plurality of the Court54 then focused on the court of appeals'
contention that release-dismissal agreements "tempt prosecutors to
'trump up' charges in reaction to a defendant's civil rights claim." 55
The plurality recognized that this issue merited concern, but
pointed out that "a per se rule of invalidity fails to credit other rele-
vant public interests and improperly assumes prosecutorial miscon-
duct." 56 One such public interest that the plurality recognized was
49 Id. at 1192 n.3. The majority recognized, however, that its analogy between plea
bargains and release-dismissal agreements was imperfect.
The former are subject to judicial oversight. Moreover, when the State enters a
plea bargain with a criminal defendant, it receives immediate and tangible bene-
fits.... The benefits the State may realize in particular cases from release-dismissal
agreements may not be as tangible, but they are not insignificant.
50 Id. at 1192. In Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1978), the Court held
that
not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every pressure or
encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid. Specifically, there is no per se rule
against encouraging guilty pleas.
51 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1192.
52 Id. at 1193.
53 Id.
54 Justice O'Connor did not join in this part of the opinion. See infra notes 55-63 and
accompanying text for a discussion ofJustice O'Connor's opinion in Rumery.
55 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1193 (plurality opinion)(quoting
Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d at 70).
56 Id. at 1193 (plurality opinion). The Court noted that disciplinary rules are already
in effect against prosecutors who act improperly. Id. at 1193 n.4. Specifically, the
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-105(A) (1980) provides that "[a]
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the burden on the courts of frivolous section 1983 claims.57 The
plurality stated that "[m]any [section 1983 claims] are marginal and
some are frivolous."' 58 This belief led the plurality to announce that
"[t]o the extent release-dismissal agreements protect public officials
from the burdens of defending such unjust claims, they further this
important public interest." 59
The plurality then criticized the tircuit court for assuming that
prosecutors will trump up charges in response to a defendant's sec-
tion 1983 claim by reiterating the principle that courts must defer to
prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute. 60 Specifically, the
plurality recognized the complex factors that enter into a prosecu-
tor's decision, including the strength and importance of a case,
tangibles and intangibles specific to the case and, finally, the best
method of allocating the scarce resources of the criminal justice sys-
tem.61 Based on the policy of deference to prosecutorial decisions
and the complex factors on which those decisions are based, the
Court refused to assume that prosecutors act maliciously when a
section 1983 claim arises.62 Therefore, the Court refused to recog-
nize a per se rule against release-dismissal agreements simply out of
a fear of malicious motives.
Rather, guided by the belief that many release-dismissal agree-
ments contain a net social benefit, 63 the Court chose to analyze the
validity of release-dismissal agreements on a case-by-case basis.
The Court upheld as valid release-dismissal contracts involving the
waiver of the constitutional right to a civil remedy so long as they
are voluntary, not adverse to public interests and not the result of
prosecutorial misconduct.64
B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that Rumery's re-
lease-dismissal agreement should be enforced. She wrote separately
lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal
charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter."
57 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct at 1194 (plurality opinion).
58 Id. (plurality opinion).
59 Id. (plurality opinion).
60 Id. (plurality opinion). (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978))
.. .[s]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused commit-
ted an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute... generally
rests entirely in his discretion.").
61 Id. at 1194. (plurality opinion).
62 Id. (plurality opinion).





to emphasize, however, that the party relying on the covenant as an
affirmative defense to a section 1983 claim must establish that the
civil plaintiff entered into it voluntarily and without prosecutorial
misconduct. 65 Thus, Justice O'Connor declined to join the plurality
in assuming that Rumery entered into the agreement voluntarily
and that the prosecutor did not act maliciously. Instead, she would
have reversed the holding of the First Circuit because the evidence
established that Rumery acted voluntarily and that the prosecution
did not act maliciously. 66
Justice O'Connor agreed that a case-by-case analysis of release-
dismissal agreements is proper.67 Under the appropriate circum-
stances, she asserted that such agreements spare "the local commu-
nity the expense of litigation associated with some minor crimes for
which there is little or no public interest in prosecution." 68 On the
other hand, Justice O'Connor was also aware of the perils of release-
dismissal agreements. She feared that the agreements may tempt
prosecutors to bring groundless criminal charges in order to deter
meritorious section 1983 suits. 69 Conversely, Justice O'Connor ar-
gued that the agreements may cause a prosecutor to drop a valid
criminal case in order to foreclose a governmental body's exposure
to civil liability. 70 She added that, on the whole, "[b]y introducing
extraneous considerations [such as release-dismissal agreements]
into the criminal process, the legitimacy of that process may be
undermined." 71
Justice O'Connor further stated that "[t]he central problem
with the release-dismissal agreement is that public criminal justice
interests are explicitly traded against the private financial interest of
individuals involved in the arrest and prosecution."7 2 She finally
contended that the process of negotiating release-dismissal agree-
ments should take place under judicial supervision in order to pre-
vent allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. 73
65 Id. at 1195-96 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66 Id.(O'Connor, J., concurring).
67 Id. at 1196 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
68 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
69 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
70 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). cf. Hoines v. Barney's Club, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 603,
610, 620 P.2d 628, 633, 170 Cal. Rptr. 42, 46 (1980) "On no occasion has a prosecu-
tor-motivated by what he reasonably deemed to be in the interest ofjustice been held
to have compounded a crime by promising to dismiss a charge in consideration of an
accused's release of civil liabilities or stipulation of probable cause.").
71 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1196 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
72 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
73 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor recognized that there is a high
degree ofjudicial supervision in plea bargains. For instance, "[b]efore accepting a plea
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Notwithstanding her criticism of release-dismissal agreements,
Justice O'Connor maintained that an individual analysis of each case
is the best method to determine the enforceability of the agree-
ment.74 Shejoined with the four plurality Justices in Rumery, noting
that, because the charge against Rumery was a lesser felony, the cov-
enant spared Deary further suffering and that Rumery made a vol-
untary and informed decision. 75
Given her belief in the enforceability of Rumery's covenant,
Justice O'Connor stated that she would have shifted the burden to
the town only to prove that the agreement was voluntary and that
there was no prosecutorial misconduct.76 She criticized the plurality
for presuming at the outset that the agreement was voluntary and
that prosecutorial misconduct was absent.77 Thus, although Justice
O'Connor identified a number of areas where release-dismissal
agreements could produce more harm than good, she still sup-
ported a case-by-case approach to determine their validity. For all
practical purposes, then, Justice O'Connor only disagreed with the
plurality as to whom should bear the burden of proving the agree-
ment's validity. In the case at hand, her disagreement with the plu-
rality effectively made no difference.
C. THE DISSENTING OPINION
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Stevens and joined
by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun, stated
that the majority failed to recognize the complexity underlying the
decision to enforce the release-dismissal agreements. Although the
dissent sharply criticized the majority, in the end, it also hesitated to
adopt an absolute rule against all release-dismissal agreements. 78
Instead, the dissent went only so far as to advocate a strong pre-
sumption against the validity of release-dismissal agreements. 79
The dissent also pointed out that an intelligent and informed
but completely innocent person could be forced to choose between
either a threatened indictment and trial or his right to a section
1983 remedy against governmental bodies and their officers. 80 This
pursuant to a plea agreement, the court shall advise the parties whether it approves the
agreement and will dispose of the case in accordance therewith." MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.5(4) (1975).
74 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1197 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
75 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
76 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1205 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 1198 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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point led the dissent to argue that it would be very difficult for a
defendant to enter voluntarily into a release-dismissal agreement.81
The dissenting justices illustrated their point by discussing the di-
lemma that Rumery faced when he decided to enter into a release-
dismissal agreement.8 2 Such a dilemma arose when Chief Barrett
arrested Rumery even though Deary refused to produce a written
statement implicating him.8 3 Although Rumery's attorney knew that
these facts weakened the prosecutor's case, he nevertheless advised
Rumery to enter into the release-dismissal agreement because, even
if Rumery were completely innocent, an acquittal would not be
guaranteed. 84
The dissenting justices thus viewed Rumery's decision as "vol-
untary, deliberate and informed."85 In their view, Rumery ration-
ally weighed the benefits and burdens of the agreement and
concluded that it was in his best interest to sign.86 The dissent
pointed out that, although this decision met the majority's test, the
test was an insufficient basis on which to enforce the agreement.8 7
Taking the majority's test to the extreme, the dissent said: "There
is nothing irrational about an agreement to bribe a police officer, to
enter into a wagering arrangement ... or to threaten to indict an
innocent man in order to induce him to surrender something of
value."88 In short, the dissent maintained that it was improper to
determine the enforceability of a release-dismissal agreement on the
basis of the voluntariness of the criminal defendant's decision-mak-
ing process.8 9
The dissent further argued that release-dismissal agreements
fail to serve society's interest in punishing wrongdoers.90 To prove
this contention, the dissent compared and contrasted plea bargains
and release-dismissal agreements. Justice Stevens argued that a
plea bargain strikes "a delicate balance of individual and social ad-
81 Id. at 1200 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 1199 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 1200 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Attorney Woods testified " '[n]ow whereas
Mr. Rumery had a great deal of confidence in the criminal justice system, I had less
confidence, not so much in the criminal justice system but in the trial system; that I
recognized that, you know, no lawyer is going to guarantee a result regardless of the
guilt or innocence of their client.' " Id. at 1200 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting
Record at 56).
85 Id. at 1200 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
86 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 1201 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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vantage" 91 because it represents a practical compromise between
parties, taking into account the burdens of litigation, the probable
outcome, and society's interest in imposing punishment on an ad-
mittedly guilty person.92 The dissent asserted further that the ad-
vantages of plea bargaining covenants do not exist in release-
dismissal agreements. 93 By entering into a release-dismissal agree-
ment, the dissent admitted that the state is spared the burden of
litigating both the criminal and civil suits. 9 4 The dissent pointed
out, however, that the prosecution's willingness to drop the charge
would indicate that the case might have been unworthy of pursuing
in the first place. 95 For instance, in Rumery, the prosecution knew
that Deary was unwilling to testify against Rumery. This factor
could have created great difficulty for the prosecution when it tried
to build its case. Hence, the dissent concluded that the release-dis-
missal agreement afforded the state the advantages of not having to
litigate a potentially costly civil suit and of dropping a potentially
weak criminal case. 96 This scenario, according to the dissentingjus-
tices, failed to strike the balance of individual and social advantage
found in plea bargains. 97
The dissent also pointed out that release-dismissal agreements
fail to serve the legitimate social interest in the punishment of
wrongdoers. 98 Unlike plea bargains, the dissent noted that the
agreements simply resolve the question of section 1983 liability.99
This point led the dissent to discuss the disproportionate exchange
that occurs in the typical release-dismissal agreement. Justice Ste-
vens stated that "a defendant who is required to give up [a section
1983] claim in exchange for a dismissal of a criminal charge is being
forced to pay a price that is unrelated to his possible wrongdoing as
reflected in that charge."' 0 0
The dissent then shifted its focus to the role of the prosecutor
in release-dismissal agreements. Justice Stevens argued that, by al-
lowing the prosecutor to take part in the agreement, the plurality
wrongly permitted him to represent interests not related to his offi-
91 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)
93 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)
94 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)
96 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 1202 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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cial duties. 01 Specifically, the dissent identified three interests that
the prosecutor in Rumery represented. First, Justice Stevens noted
that the prosecutor represented the State of New Hampshire's inter-
est in the enforcement of its criminal laws.' 0 2 Second, the dissent
asserted that the prosecutor represented the interests of the Town
of Newton and its officers in connection with their possible section
1983 liability.' 03 Finally, the dissent stated that the prosecutor
claimed to represent the interests of Deary, a reluctant, emotionally
distressed witness who the prosecutor sought to shield from further
harm.104
The dissent argued that the prosecutor should have only repre-
sented the first of these three interests.' 05 His primary duty was to
represent the State of New Hampshire in its case against Rumery.
Justice Stevens noted that the prosecutor and the state enjoy immu-
nity to any section 1983 claim arising out of the prosecutor's deci-
sion to initiate criminal proceedings.' 0 6 As a result, the dissent
concluded that the release-dismissal agreement was completely un-
necessary to protect the interest of the state.'0 7 Justice Stevens as-
serted that the prosecutor must have seen an advantage to the
release-dismissal agreement in the way it would benefit either the
Town of Newton or Deary.
The prosecutor's decision to protect the town was improper,
according to the dissent. Justice Stevens argued that a severe con-
flict exists between this goal and Prosecutor Graf's duty to enforce
the law. The dissent noted that "[t]he public is entitled to have the
prosecutor's decision to go forward with a criminal case, or to dis-
miss it, made independently of his concerns about the potential
damages liability of the police department."'' 0 8 Moreover, the dis-
sent feared that the possibility that a criminal defendant will execute
a release-dismissal agreement might encourage a prosecutor unnec-
essarily to bring or continue a prosecution that is not supported by
probable cause. 10 9
Similarly, the dissent maintained that it was improper for the
prosecutor to consider Deary's interests in deciding whether to
101 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 1203 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
105 Id. at 1202 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
106 Id. (Stevens J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 1202 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
108 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 1203 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
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enter into the release-dismissal agreement. 110 The dissent main-
tained that an inherent conflict of interest exists between a prosecu-
tor and a reluctant witness. In certain cases, a prosecutor must
obtain crucial testimony "despite the desire of the witness to remain
anonymous or to avoid a courtroom confrontation with an of-
fender.""' Therefore, "[ilt would plainly be unwise for the court
[to enforce] a release-dismissal agreement ... simply because it af-
fords protection to a potential witness." 12 In sum, the dissenting
justices believed that release-dismissal agreements should never be
executed for the benefit of a witness.
Even though the dissent discussed no advantages to the release-
dismissal agreement, it concluded that it was "hesitant to adopt an
absolute rule invalidating all such agreements." ' 1 3 However, the
dissent argued that it is unlikely that the administrative cost to the
state of determining the validity of the agreements through litiga-
tion will be outweighed by any benefits that they will produce."14
Justice Stevens further pointed out that the "very existence of [sec-
tion 1983] identifies the important federal interests in providing a
remedy for the violation of constitutional rights." 1 5 According to
the dissent, this important federal interest almost always outweighs
any interests the State has in enforcing release-dismissal agree-
ments. 16 These contentions ultimately led the dissent to advocate a
strong presumption against the enforcement of release-dismissal
agreements.117
IV. ANALYSIS
A. APPARENT CONFLICT AMONG LOWER COURTS
At first glance, it appears that the lower courts were in conflict
over the validity of pre-conviction release-dismissal agreements in
which a criminal defendant bargains away his right to a civil remedy.
A closer look reveals, however, that the lower courts overwhelm-
ingly adopted a per se rule against pre-conviction release-dismissal
agreements such as that at issue in Rumery.
The majority of the Rumery Court mistakenly cited two lower
court decisions that apparently had applied the voluntariness test to
110 Id. at 1202 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
III Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 1204 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 1205 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
114 Id. at 1205 n.22 (StevensJ, dissenting).
115 Id. at 1205 (StevensJ., dissenting).
116 Id. at 1205-1206 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 1205 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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conclude that release-dismissal agreements are enforceable on a
case-by-case basis. 18 The majority's reliance on these cases is inap-
propriate. In Jones v. Taber,'1 9 a convicted criminal was in jail await-
ing sentencing. 120 The employees of the jail bound, gagged,
stripped, and beat the convict.12 1 Weeks later and without notice,
officials of the county took the convict to a meeting with the county's
deputy counsel. 122 The convict accepted $500 in exchange for a
release of all claims that he might bring against the county or its
officers. 123 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded
the lower court's approval of this agreement for a determination of
whether the release was "voluntary, deliberate and informed."' 124
Although the Rumery majority cited Jones to bolster its conclu-
sion that release-dismissal agreements should be upheld if they were
executed voluntarily, the standard of review in Jones actually has no
bearing on the facts of Rumery. The Jones case merely involved an
offer of cash in exchange for the release of civil claims. Because this
transaction is a basic tort settlement, theJones court did not discuss
whether voluntariness is necessary for the valid exchange of a crimi-
nal suit for a civil suit. Therefore, the Rumery majority's application
ofJones was improper becauseJones does not actually deal with pre-
conviction release-dismissal agreements.
The majority also cited Bushnell v. Rossetti, 125 a case in which an
attorney was convicted of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.
After the trial court found the attorney guilty, he agreed to dismiss
his section 1983 claim against the municipality in exchange for its
recommendation of probation.' 26 The Bushnell court agreed with
the decisions that upheld the per se abolition of pre-conviction re-
lease-dismissal agreements. 127 However, the court in Bushnell found
"no comparable public policy concerns in relation to releases given
in exchange for post-conviction sentencing recommendations."' 128
As a result, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
holding of the lower court because the convicted attorney entered
into the agreement voluntarily after his conviction.' 29 As is apparent
118 Id. at 1195 n.10.
119 648 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1981).




124 Id. at 1203.
125 750 F.2d 298 (4th Cir. 1984).
126 Id. at 299.
127 Id. at 301.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 302.
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from the facts, Bushnell, unlike Rumery, does not deal with a pre-con-
viction release-dismissal agreement.
The cases on which the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Rumery relied to declare a per se abolition of pre-conviction release-
dismissal agreements were more applicable to the facts of Rumery.
The seminal case, Dixon v. District of Columbia,130 involved a "tacit
agreement" whereby the appellant promised not to proceed with his
section 1983 claim if the District did not prosecute his outstanding
traffic violations.13' When Dixon violated the covenant and pursued
his civil claim, the prosecutor re-opened the criminal case. 132 The
prosecutor implicitly admitted that re-opening the case in retaliation
for Dixon's violation of the covenant was an abuse of his discre-
tion.' 33 Notwithstanding its finding of abuse of discretion in this
case, the Dixon court denounced all release-dismissal agreements as
"odious" and against the public interest. 3 4
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in MacDonald v. Mu-
sick 135 similarly upheld the per se abolition of release-dismissal
agreements. The court announced that "[i]t is no part of the proper
duty of the prosecutor to use a criminal prosecution to forestall a
civil proceeding by the defendant against policemen, even where the
civil case arises from the events that are also the basis for the crimi-
nal charge."' 1 6 The First Circuit in Rumeiy v. Town of Newton found
these cases on point and thus followed the weight of precedent.' 3 7
A number of subsequent cases also have declared that pre-convic-
tion release-dismissal agreements are void.138 The weight of prece-
130 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
131 Id. at 968.
132 Id.
133 Id.
'34 Id. at 969.
135 MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852
(1970).
136 Id. at 375.
137 Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d at 78.
138 See Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 88 (7th Cir. 1975)("We think that the release is
void as against public policy."); Home v. Pane, 514 F. Supp. 551, 552 (S.D.N.Y.
1981)("It seems to us beyond question that a criminal defendant forced to choose be-
tween being prosecuted on criminal charges on the one hand, and not being prosecuted
but giving up certain constitutionally guaranteed civil rights on the other, cannot as a
matter of law make an uncoerced choice."); Shepard v. Byrd, 581 F. Supp. 1374, 1386
(N.D. Ga. 1984)("The Court considers this practice as against public policy because...
it forestalls civil actions designed both to compensate citizens for lawless governmental-
conduct and to deter such conduct."); Brothers v. Rosauer's Supermarkets, Inc., 545 F.
Supp. 1041, 1042 (D. Mont. 1982)("But, at a minimum, any person bringing about an
arrest is entitled to expect that the decision of the prosecutor will not be based upon
considerations extraneous to the proper handling of the criminal case."); Williamsen v.
Jernberg, 99 Ill. App. 2d 371, 375, 240 N.E.2d 758, 760 (1968)(Contracts not to prose-
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dent prior to the Court's holding in Rumery, therefore,
overwhelmingly favored the per se abolition of pre-conviction re-
lease-dismissal agreements.
B. EVALUATION OF MAJORITY OPINION
1. Assumption of Prosecutorial Misconduct
The majority of the Rumery Court did not base its holding solely
on common law precedent. Rather, the majority also believed that
the case-by-case evaluation of release-dismissal agreements pro-
duces benefits for society.' 3 9 The majority failed however to iden-
tify persuasively any of these benefits.
The only persuasive argument that the majority put forth was
its criticism of the dissent for assuming that release-dismissal agree-
ments tempt prosecutors to bring frivolous criminal suits as a means
of eliminating section 1983 suits.' 4 0 Indeed, no evidence exists to
contradict the majority's declaration that "tradition and experience
justify [the Court's] belief that the great majority of prosecutors will
be faithful to their duty."'' Although certain prosecutorial actions
are obviously vindictive and are presumed vindictive, 142 release-dis-
missal agreements do not fall into this category. In fact, prosecutors
in certain cases apparently enter the agreements with the defend-
ant's best interest in mind.' 43 Moreover, if a prosecutor acts im-
cute in a private action void as a matter of law.); Gray v. City of Galesburg, 71 Mich.
App. 161, 166, 247 N.W.2d 338, 341 (1976)("We find that this agreement is repugnant
to public policy because contracts of such a nature may tend to deprive the public of
their right to vigorous enforcement of penal statutes."); Kurlander v. Davis, 103 Misc.
2d 919, 926, 427 N.Y.S.2d 376, 381 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)("To permit the prosecutor,
an agent of the State, to confer a benefit on those who surrender their right to pursue
the police for wrongs committed in the course of their official duties is to sanction a
procedure which creates an imbalance in a system established to insure equal justice.");
People v. Wilmont, 104 Misc. 2d 412, 414, 428 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980) ("This entire proceeding is an example of the use of the criminal process for other
than the ends of pure criminal justice."). But see Hoines v. Barney's Club, Inc., 28 Cal.
3d 603, 613-14, 620 P.2d 628, 635, 170 Cal. Rptr. 42, 49 (1980)("We conclude that the
time honored practice of discharging misdemeanants on condition of a release of civil
liabilities or stipulation of probable cause for arrest, does not contravene public policy
when the prosecutor acts in the interests ofjustice."); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v.Joy, 283
Md. 205, 216, 389 A.2d 874, 881 (1978)("To hold that a civil release executed... [by a
first time offender] is unenforceable as a matter of public policy would be to place an
unwarranted constraint upon the prosecutor, who might ... wish to extend a compas-
sionate hand to a first time offender.").
139 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1194.
140 Id. at 1193.
141 Id. at 1194.
142 Id. at 1194 n.7.
143 See, e.g., Hoines v. Barney's Club, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 603, 606, 620 P.2d 628, 630, 170
Cal. Rptr. 42, 44 (1980), in which the prosecutor testified that the primary factor moti-
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properly, rules already exist to remedy the misconduct. 144 It is,
therefore, illogical to assume that release-dismissal agreements
cause prosecutors to act improperly. However, a plethora of other
reasons, as discussed below, exist which indicate that release-dismis-
sal agreements are not in the public's interest.
2. Elimination of Trivial Claims
The plurality upheld release-dismissal agreements partly be-
cause they purportedly reduced section 1983 claims. 145 The major-
ity pointed out that many constitutional tort claims are "frivolous"
and "marginal."'' 46 Understandably, the federal courts resent hav-
ing to allocate their scarce resources to hear claims of lost shoes,
cigarettes, and toothpaste. 147 However, the "difficult issue is how to
avoid trivializing the concepts of constitutional protection inherent
in section 1983 without seriously impairing its utility as a method
for protecting essential liberties."' 48 The majority focused on such
trivial claims while ignoring section 1983's legitimate function of
providing a remedy to victims of public misconduct.
The Rumery Court failed to give adequate weight to the public's
great interest in providing redress for official abuses of power and
protecting essential constitutional liberties. In contrast to the ma-
jority's view, a Michigan court articulately stated:
[I]f the officers' conduct was tortious, the public has no interest in
denying their victims redress. If, on the other hand, the officers acted
legally, they are afforded the full protection of the law and need not
resort to the release for vindication. 149
Moreover, the very existence of section 1983 means that the
government sees a need to remedy constitutional torts. 150 A claim
vating him to propose a release-dismissal agreement was the plaintiff's concern that a
conviction could prohibit him from admission to the California bar. See also Bushnell v.
Rossetti, 750 F.2d 298, 299 (4th Cir. 1984) in which counsel for the civil defendant
pointed out to the prosecutor that a criminal conviction would pose professional
problems for Bushnell. The prosecutor cooperated with the civil defendant and recom-
mended probation.
144 See supra note 56.
145 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1194 (plurality opinion).
146 Id.
147 Mead, Evolution of the 'Species of Tort Liability' Created By 42 U.S. C. [section] 1983: Can
Constitutional Tort be Saved from Extinction?, 55 FORDHAm L. REV. 1, 13 (1986).
148 Id.
149 Gray v. City of Galesburg, 71 Mich. App. 161, 164, 247 N.W. 2d 338, 340 (1976).
150 North American Cold Storage Co. v. County of Cook, 531 F. Supp. 1003, 1006
(N.D. Ill. 1982) ("Plaintiffs in the instant case asserted a federal right to be fully compen-
sated for injuries arising from a constitutional violation.... [W]hen a cause of action




arising under section 1983, like any other cause of action, will invite
some meritorious and some frivolous claims. Certainly, no other
cause of action is stifled simply because some claims are frivolous.
Thus the Court should not have approved release-dismissal agree-
ments merely because they allegedly reduce frivolous claims. This
is especially true since the majority offered no proof that the agree-
ments target only frivolous claims. In fact, it appears that release-
dismissal agreements eliminate the most meritorious of all section
1983 claims.1 51
The handful of cases that deal with release-dismissal agree-
ments are woven together by the common thread of meritorious
civil rights allegations. The claimants have alleged, for instance, po-
lice misconduct, 52 racially motivated violence, 153 and even the
abuse of a pregnant woman. 154 Indeed, the police arrested Bernard
Rumery under questionable circumstances that might possibly have
given his claim merit. 155 In these circumstances, the public's inter-
est in providing redress is great. Yet, it is also in these cases that the
benefits of a release-dismissal agreement become most apparent to
the public officials. The people who most deserve redress may well
be the first offered the opportunity to enter into the agreements.
Thus, release-dismissal agreements may stifle the most meritorious
claims, not the most frivolous claims.
3. Commingling Civil and Criminal Justice Systems
The majority of the Rumery Court recognized that criminal de-
fendants face a number of difficult choices as they proceed through
the criminal justice system. 156 The Court recognized that plea-bar-
gaining does not violate the Constitution, even though these agree-
ments result in the waiver of important constitutional rights. 157
Following this premise to its logical end, the Court upheld release-
dismissal agreements even though these agreements result in the
waiver of important rights to a civil remedy.' 58
The Court's analogy of plea bargains to release-dismissal agree-
ments is superficial. The analogy highlights the similarities between
151 See infra notes 152-155 and accompanying text.
152 MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373, 374 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852
(1970); Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Home v.
Pane, 514 F. Supp. 551, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
153 Dixon, 394 F.2d at 968 n.2; Home, 514 F. Supp. at 552.
154 Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 85 (7th Cir. 1975).
155 See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1199 (Stevens, J., dissenting).





the agreements while it ignores the fundamental and crucial differ-
ences between them. The two types of agreements contain undenia-
ble similarities. Plea bargains provide mutual advantages to the
state and the defendant.' 5 9 The state may speedily punish a defend-
ant after he has admitted guilt.' 60 The state also conserves its judi-
cial resources for those cases which must go to trial.' 6 ' The
defendant benefits by avoiding the uncertainty of a criminal trial and
by being treated with leniency.162
Like plea bargains, release-dismissal agreements contain mu-
tual benefits for the parties. The state conserves its resources by
avoiding both criminal and civil suits. The defendant benefits by
trading his arguably speculative civil suit for the certain benefits of
having the criminal suit dropped. Thus, on an individual level, re-
lease-dismissal agreements can benefit both parties. Yet, the overall
harm that the agreements cause greatly outweighs any benefits they
produce. This harm stems from the fact that release-dismissal
agreements improperly mesh the civil and criminal justice systems.
Plea bargains, in contrast, do not exceed the bounds of the criminal
justice system. The significance of this contrast cannot be over-
stated. One court has pointed out the basic impropriety of mixing
the civil and criminal justice systems, opining that "if the criminal
process is to regain its rightful place. ., courts must resist the use
of the criminal process as a civil court.. ., family court, [and] expe-
ditious collection agency. '"163
The principles of contract law also help explain why it is im-
proper to jumble the criminal and civil justice systems. In release-
dismissal agreements, the consideration for the dismissal of criminal
charges is the value of the defendant's civil suit. Regardless of
whether the suit is worth fifty cents or fifty thousand dollars, the
159 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. As a matter of practical policy, American courts accept the concept of plea
bargaining. However, the practice of exchanging guilty pleas for lenient sentences is
subject to powerful criticism. One judge has noted that plea bargaining "places in the
hands of a prosecutor-essentially an administrative officer-the opportunity to usurp
the legislative process." Foley, Plea Bargaining Is: No Bargain!, 64 MIcH. B.J. 505 (June
1985). Moreover, Judge Foley has argued that plea bargains are inherently'coercive.
"To conclude that a plea of guilty.., to a lesser offense where it is claimed that the plea
is freely, understandingly and voluntarily given ... is sheer hyprocrisy." Id. at 506.
Another author has argued that the government has an unfair advantage in the pro-
cess. "In spite of the noble language of the Constitution, the government has literally
all of the advantages in the criminal trial process." Fierer, Plea Bargaining in the American
Courts: The Lady Is a Tige, 19 TRIAL 52, 57 (Oct. 1983).




contract is tantamount to a sanctioning of the exchange of money
for the dismissal of a criminal suit. Because of this result, an Illinois
court has held that "[w]here any part of the consideration for a con-
tractual obligation executed to compromise civil injuries resulting
from a criminal act is a promise that the prosecution for the criminal
act shall be suppressed, the contract is unenforceable."' 164 Thus,
the Rumery Court should have looked beyond any individual benefits
that release-dismissal agreements confer to determine whether the
transactions serve society's best interests.
Based on society's interest in enforcing only fair contracts, the
Court should have kept release-dismissal agreements presumptively
invalid. As stated, the consideration in these agreements violates
public policy. The dissent in Rumery recognized that, if one follows
the majority's argument to its logical conclusion, it becomes clear
that any form of consideration, from the value of a section 1983
claim to a cash payment, should be permitted. 165 The end, after all,
is the same: the defendant does not face criminal charges; the mu-
nicipality or official does not face the section 1983 claim; but, soci-
ety's interest in properly resolving both the criminal and civil claims
is ignored.
Commingling the civil and criminal justice systems is improper
because it permits prosecutors, even ones acting in good faith, to
consider factors outside of the criminal justice system in deciding
whether to prosecute. Prosecutors should not have the ability to
base their decisions on the existence of section 1983 claims. A crim-
inal case must stand on its own merits, 166 as extraneous factors
could interfere with the proper adjudication of the case.1 67 More-
over, "it is not the function of the prosecutor to decide whether a
potential civil suit has merit. He is neither judge nor jury; he hears
no evidence; his decision is not subject to judicial review." 168
The Rumery dissent's contention that release-dismissal agree-
ments wrongly permit the prosecutor to represent interests not ger-
mane to his official duties is persuasive. The prosecutor must
represent only the state in the "evenhanded and effective enforce-
164 Williamsen v. Jernberg, 91 111. App. 2d 371, 375, 240 N.E.2d 758, 760 (1968).
165 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1200 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166 MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373, 375 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852
(1970); Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
167 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1196 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("By
introducing extraneous considerations into the criminal process, the legitimacy of that
process may be compromised.").
168 Hoines v. Barney's Club Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 603, 618, 620 P.2d 628, 638, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 42, 52 (1980)(Tobriner, J., dissenting).
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ment of its criminal laws." 1 69 In carrying out his duties, the prose-
cutor may legitimately decide to abandon a charge because he lacks
a good faith belief that the state has sufficient evidence to convict,
that the case has a low deterrence value, or that the case has little
importance to the prosecutor.'7 0
However, the existence of a civil suit is not a proper reason to
proceed with a case. 17' If the prosecutor considers the civil suit, he
must take into account the potential liability of public entities and
officials in deciding whether to move toward trial. The results of
this inquiry could easily obscure the prosecutor's overriding duty to
represent the state's interest in enforcing its criminal laws. 172 For
instance, it is not difficult to imagine a case involving a serious crimi-
nal offense and a related abuse of the defendant's constitutional
rights. Surely, no one would be comfortable if the state allowed the
accused criminal to avoid prosecution simply because a public offi-
cial acted tortiously. On the other hand, the state has an important
interest in providing a remedy for the victims of public misconduct.
The remedy is monetary and should not be confused with the crimi-
nal suit. In sum, the criminal and civil suit each demand individual
attention, and it serves no proper interest to mix them together.
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor suggested that release-
dismissal agreements would be more palatable if they were executed
underjudicial supervision. 173 She apparently believed that this pro-
tection would address the argument that release-dismissal agree-
ments give the prosecutor unreasonably broad authority. 174 In
reality, judicial oversight would not bolster the credibility of release-
dismissal agreements. Even if the prosecutor's discretion were lim-
ited, pre-conviction release-dismissal agreements should still be
presumptively invalid. As one court pointed out:
The situation is made no better by the fact that here the record indi-
cates that it was the court that asked [the defendant] whether he would
stipulate [to the release-dismissal agreement]. Rather, it makes it
worse. It brings the court to the aid of the prosecutor in coercing the
defendant into agreeing to what amounts to a forfeiture of his civil
169 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1202 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934)("The United States Attorney is the rep-
resentative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obliga-
tion to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but thatjustice
shall be done.").
170 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
171 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1202 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173 Id. at 1197 (O'Connor, J., concurring).




Release-dismissal agreements are plagued with so many
problems that no amount of judicial supervision could make them
tolerable in this country's legal system.
C. PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES
1. Suppression of Allegations of Misconduct
"A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on
the grounds of public policy ... if the interest in its enforcement is
clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against
the enforcement of such terms."17 6 The many public policy disad-
vantages of release-dismissal agreements outweigh any interest in
their enforcement.
Pre-conviction release-dismissal agreements violate public pol-
icy because they suppress evidence of the misconduct of public offi-
cials. As Circuit Judge Bazelon in Dixon v. District of Columbia stated,
"these agreements suppress complaints against police misconduct
which should be thoroughly aired in a free society."' 177 Moreover,
the court in Bushnell v. Rossetti distinguished pre-conviction and
post-conviction release-dismissal agreements on the ground that the
former never provide the civil complainant a hearing on the issue of
the civil wrong. 178 While it is true in a post-conviction setting that
"a further civil inquiry into police misconduct is avoided, that in-
quiry would simply be duplicative in a civil forum of one already
publicly made in the criminal forum."' 179 It is precisely for this rea-
son that the Bushnell court upheld only those "release agreements
negotiated after determination of guilt, but before sentencing."' 80
Although the Bushnell court failed to recognize that post-convic-
tion agreements have invidious features similar to those of pre-con-
viction agreements, it did recognize the important public interest in
exposing and remedying violations of constitutional rights by public
officials. If society is to eliminate public abuses of power, it must
encourage victims to step forward and expose the abuses. Release-
dismissal agreements hinder this significant social goal.
175 MacDonald, 425 F.d at 375. See also Dixon, 394 F.2d at 969.
176 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 178(1) (1981). The majority of the
Rumery court also recognized this. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1192.
177 Dixon, 394 F.2d at 69.
178 Bushnell v. Rossetti, 750 F.2d 298, 301 (4th Cir. 1984).




2. The Coercive Nauture of Release-Dismissal Agreements
Release-dismissal agreements also violate public policy because
they are inherently coercive. A contract is not enforceable if the de-
fendant can show that he was unfairly coerced into signing it.181
The general rule is that unfair coercion or duress consists of "any
wrongful act or threat which overcomes the free will of a party."' 8 2
One such wrongful act is the threat of imprisonment.18 3
In Hoines v. Barney's Club, Inc.,18 4 Judge Tobriner recognized
that the threat of imprisonment coerces defendants, leaving them
with little choice but to enter into a release-dismissal agreement.
He argued that,"[t]he threat to maintain a criminal prosecution is
... necessarily coercive. An innocent defendant may well prefer to
surrender his right to redress ... rather than undergo the risk, ex-
pense, and inconvenience of a criminal trial."15 Thus, for all prac-
tical purposes, release-dismissal agreements force defendants into
dropping legitimate civil claims and, therefore, unjustly shield pub-
lic officials from tort liability.
Since release-dismissal agreements are inherently coercive, it is
impossible to enter into them voluntarily. The dissent in Rumery
recognized that a rational person may'understand the benefits of the
agreement and "voluntarily" enter into it but that the the threat of
prosecution makes the word "voluntary" meaningless.' 8 6 Further-
more, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently applied the
Rumery test and correctly continued to recognize that release-dismis-
sal agreements are coercive.' 8 7 In Hall v. Ochs, the court noted that
"[n]ot surprisingly, after three refusals [to enter into release-dismis-
sal agreements] and well over an hour in jail, [the defendant's] re-
solve buckled. No waiver executed under such circumstances can be
181 J. CAsMxI &J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CoNTRACTs 262 (2d ed. 1977).
182 Id.
183 Id. at 264. Justice Cardozo commented on this issue in the context of private
threats to prosecute. He stated: "There is to be no traffic in the privilege of invoking
the public justice of the state. One may press a charge or withhold it as one will. One
may not make action or inaction dependent on a price." Union Exch. Nat'l Bank v.
Joseph, 231 N.Y. 250, 253, 131 N.E. 905, 906 (1921)(citing Jones v. Merionethshire
Building Society, 1 Ch. 173, 183 (1892)). But see Harrell v. Allen, 439 F.2d 1005, 1007
(5th Cir. 1971)("[I]t is clear that under Georgia law a threat to have an individual ar-
rested is not sufficient duress as will be held to restrain the free will and consent of a
party to a contract and thereby make it void.").
184 Hoines v. Barney's Club Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 603, 616, 620 P.2d 628, 637, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 42, 51 (1980)(Tobriner, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 616-17, 620 P.2d at 637, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 51 (TobrinerJ., dissenting).
186 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1202 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187 Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920, 924 (1st Cir. 1987).
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called voluntary."188 Thus, the Hall court found that only an hour
in jail prevented the defendant from voluntarily entering into the
agreement. The Hall holding further demonstrates that imprison-
ment or the threat of imprisonment precludes a criminal defendant
from entering into a release-dismissal agreement voluntarily. It is,
therefore, clear that the Rumery majority's use of the word "volun-
tary" in this context has no meaning because the defendant really
has little choice about whether or not to abandon his civil suit.
When the Rumery majority used the word "voluntary," it really
meant that the defendant simply rationally weighs the advantages of
the agreement against its burden; it did not mean that the defendant
would enter the agreement even if he were not improperly
threatened with imprisonment. Thus, the Court considered an
agreement voluntary even when the defendant, for all practical pur-
poses, was acting under duress.
3. Increased Burden on the Judicial System
The majority of the Rumery Court upheld release-dismissal
agreements as a means of efficiently allocating the scarce resources
of the judicial system.' 8 9 Ironically, the Court may have paved the
way for an increased burden on the judicial system. Prior to the
Rumery decision, the majority of courts held release-dismissal agree-
ments invalid per se.' 90 The courts have dealt with these agree-
ments infrequently.' 9 ' With the case-by-case approach announced
in Rumery, however, the courts must now microscopically analyze the
merits of each agreement. "This [new approach will] require an ex-
tensive investigation into whether the release was indeed made free
of coercion." 92
Those courts which have considered the question have con-
cluded that the issue of coercion is a question of fact to be left up to
the jury. For instance, in Hoines v. Barney's Club, Inc. ,'3 the defend-
ant's private security guard arrested Hoines for disturbing the
peace. The parties entered into a release-dismissal agreement.1 94
When the plaintiff violated the agreement and brought a section
1983 civil action, the defendant used the agreement as an affirma-
188 Id.
189 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. at 1194.
190 See supra note 138.
191 This is evidenced by the small amount of cases and scholarly literature dealing
with release-dismissal agreements.
192 Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d at 70.
193 Hoines v. Barney's Club Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 603, 605, 620 P.2d 628, 629, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 42, 43 (1980).
194 Id. at 28 Cal. 3d at 606, 620 P.2d at 630, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
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tive defense.1 95 The trial court instructed the jury to determine
whether the release-dismissal agreement was valid. 196 The court in
Jones v. Taber also recognized that "there is a triable issue of fact as
to the validity of the release."' 97
These cases suggest that the civil claimants who enter into re-
lease-dismissal agreements will have the right to jury trials to deter-
mine whether the parties entered into the agreement free of
coercion. Thus, as the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Rumery recognized, courts will have to expend an increasing
amount of their scarce resources to find the extremely rare release-
dismissal agreement which might merit enforcement. 198 In light of
the numerous drawbacks to release-dismissal agreements, the case-
by-case evaluation of the agreements will be very costly and will pro-
duce so few agreements that are found to be valid that the excep-
tions "cannot easily be shown important enough to outweigh [their]
administrative burdens."199 The interest in judicial efficiency is best
served by prohibiting the contracts per se.
V. CONCLUSION
The majority of the Rumery Court wrongly upheld the validity of
release-dismissal agreements. Furthermore, the dissent in Rumery
failed to go far enough in its criticism of pre-conviction release dis-
missal agreements. Release-dismissal agreements ignore the inter-
ests of public policy, violate the criminal defendant's constitutional
rights, and impose an unwarranted burden on the judicial system.
In Rumery v. Town of Newton, the First Circuit recognized the harm
caused by the agreements and wisely adopted a per se abolition of
all pre-conviction release-dismissal agreements.
In light of Rumery, more states will probably use release-dismis-
sal agreements. Criminal defendants will have ample opportunity to
trade their section 1983 claims for freedom from prosecution. As a
result, the public will see the state ignore its interests both in pun-
ishing criminals and in compensating the victims of constitutional
torts. One can only hope that a future session of the United States
195 Id. at 28 Cal. 3d at 607, 620 P.2d at 630, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
196 Id. at 28 Cal, 3d at 606, 620 P.2d at 630, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
197 Jones v. Taber, 648 F.2d 1201, 1206 (1981). See also Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d
576, 585 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 892 (1953) (Although he was not impris-
oned at the time he was faced with a criminal charge, the plaintiff claimed that his crimi-
nal charge constituted duress. "At least the evidence was such that the jury could have
so found; the issue was properly submitted to [the jury].").
198 Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d at 70. See also Brief for Respondent at 17-
20, Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. 1187 (1987).
199 Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d at 70.
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Supreme Court will reconsider Rumery and declare that pre-convic-
tion release-dismissal agreements are presumptively invalid.
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